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My  title  entails what I often  refer to as the  "grand  dichotomy"-
the alleged extremes  of environmental  integrity and economic devel-
opment.  This dichotomy  is usually dealt with through  "balancing"
the two  extremes  in policy  decisions.  The burden  of my  comments
will be to address the legitimacy of the "grand dichotomy."  I will do
this by commenting  on several related aspects of this overly stark
choice, thereby hoping to illustrate the futility of posing the debate in
these terms.
Those  of us  engaged  in policy analysis  and  education regard  our
mandate  as helping  individuals  and  groups assess the impacts  of
alternative courses of action. While true as it stands, I worry that this
formulation  of our role tends to underplay the importance  of assur-
ing that the issues  and choices are  carefully framed before we turn
to an assessment  of their implications.  Hence my  purpose  here will
be to argue that much more attention needs to be paid to the matter
of how the choice problem is framed.  In this regard,  the stark choice
of "environment versus economic development"  is an example of an
improperly  framed policy  issue.  I  will elaborate  on this  point in the
comments  that follow.
The Stylized  Problem
As those  of you who read  Choices magazine  will know,  recently I
have been engaged  in a debate there with the New York State Com-
missioner of Agriculture  Richard McGuire.  This debate concerns the
alleged  conflicts  between agricultural productivity  and  environmen-
tal quality.  As intimated  previously,  I  stress the qualifier  "alleged"
because  I am not  certain that this  is an accurate  portrayal  of the
choices we face.  But it is a commonly  held view.  Moreover,  casting
the debate this way tends to equate agricultural production with eco-
nomic  "development"  in rural areas-a connection that cannot with-
stand scrutiny.
Nonetheless,  I suspect that many times you are asked to comment
on the presumed conflict between  increasing agricultural production
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this discussion  is often cast  as  a  choice between  the  economic
viability of rural areas and the  "preservation"  of some quaint land-
scape.  Let me take as given my earlier assertion that increased agri-
cultural production is only indirectly related to the economic viability
of rural areas.  Starting here will allow us, in the short time available,
to pursue more carefully the central topic, which is the claimed con-
flict between the  economic viability of rural areas (economic  "devel-
opment") and environmental  quality. I will suggest that this "con-
flict"  is  simply an artifact  of how  the issues  are framed  and
discussed.
Underlying the  issues before  us are important  questions  concern-
ing perceptions  of entitlements  that determine  individual exposures
to environmental  costs.  I  am concerned  at the start, therefore,  with
the issue  of alternative  entitlement  structures  in environmental  pol-
icy.  I start with this  subject precisely  because  the  status quo  struc-
ture of actual or presumed entitlements  determines  which parties to
environmental disputes are currently bearing unwanted costs, which
parties  must  bear  the transaction  costs  of institutional change
through new environmental  policy, and which parties are able to call
upon the coercive power of the state to protect their interests.  These
aspects dominate  both the way in which  the choice problem  will be
framed and the language that will be used in the policy debate. Lan-
guage and concepts are critical here, since individuals  will claim cer-
tain "rights"  (or "property rights")  in hopes  of furthering  their spe-
cial interest in certain outcomes.
Because many  environmental  disputes are of recent origin,  or be-
cause  new knowledge  has only recently demonstrated  the real cause
of observed environmental  problems,  much environmental  policy
operates in a domain where there is "no law,"  or where the legal sit-
uation of the contending parties  is unclear.  Environmental  policy is,
at bottom, about  determining which party  to such disputes  shall re-
ceive  protection from the state. When protection  is forthcoming,  that
party  acquires  a right. To have  a  "right"  is to have  the capacity  to
call upon the state to protect one's current or future interests in par-
ticular outcomes (Bromley,  1991a).
To  illustrate the role  of presumed  entitlements  in  the assessment
of environmental  risk,  consider an example  of the  chemical  con-
tamination of a river important for commercial  fishing.  Assume farm-
ers are currently using pesticides that wash into the river without re-
gard  for the interests  of the  fishing industry.  Under this  status quo
setting the entire public discussion will tend to focus on levels of con-
centration  of certain  chemical  residues  in fish.  Various  experts will
be called to comment  on the meaning of such indicators as parts per
billion of certain chemical  compounds.  Others  will advise  on the
number of servings per month  of fish that can reasonably  be consid-
ered safe. Experts  will disagree,  of course, and so the argument will
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the pesticides.
In the interest of "resolving"  this policy problem there  will be re-
search support to assess the tolerance  levels of laboratory animals  to
different doses of the subject compounds.  The debate will rage, and
scientific  experts  will  participate  in discussions  regarding  the  proc-
essing of information by citizens. In the meantime  there will be eco-
nomic  loss to the local fishing industry as its product falls under a
cloud  of suspicion  regarding safety.  The media  may well report the
hard luck of families dependent upon the fishery.  There will also,
most assuredly,  be reports of those families dependent upon agri-
cultural production.  The problem will be defined-or framed-as
one  of jobs and economic  activity versus a pure environment.  Some
will even seek to cast the issue as a choice  of letting the "market
work"  as  against bowing to "government  intervention."  That  is, the
status quo-in which chemical residues  wash into  the river-will  be
regarded  by  some as letting the market  work.  Government  inter-
ference in  the market will,  in all  probability,  be the term used  to
refer to a proposed change  in the status quo situation  in order to
protect the interests of the fishing families and the concerns of those
who seek to consume  fish.
The strange  convolution  of facts  and  concepts that emerges  from
this  stylized environmental  conflict will tend to dominate  public pol-
icy discussions  and hence the ultimate resolution of the  problem.
Farmers  will  no doubt  claim  that they have  a  "right"  to  use
pesticides  as  they have  been doing  for some  time now.  Those  who
fish in the river will claim  they have a "right"  to be free from the
threat  of chemical  contamination  of fish.  While  these  conflicting
claims  of a  "right"  are incoherent,  there  is  a  more  fundamental
problem.  Specifically,  while such rights claims tend to dominate  dis-
cussions  of environmental  policy,  little attention is paid to the role  of
presumed  or actual entitlements  in the debate. There are two relat-
ed aspects of this problem.
First, the status quo entitlement  structure  will be taken as  the le-
gitimate starting point  for legal-as well as political and economic-
deliberations.  Second,  each party  to  a  dispute  will  employ  specific
language  to buttress its  particular  claim.  We  know  well that few
words pack as much emotional appeal as  "rights."  Our political  his-
tory and rhetoric is fairly cluttered  with rights claims-a "right to
keep and bear arms,"  a "right  to the pursuit  of happiness,"  a "right
to property,"  a "right against unreasonable  search,"  a "right to due
process,"  a  "right  to free  speech,"  and more.  Indeed,  even  the re-
cent debates  over smoking in public  places is dominated by those
claiming they have a "right"  to smoke,  while others claim they have
a "right"  to clean air.  These self-serving  appeals are not at all help-
ful,  primarily  because  they betray  a fundamental  confusion  over
what  constitutes a  right.  I will illustrate  how the presumed status
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ronmental policy.
Consider,  once  again,  the above  example  of chemical  contamina-
tion of fishing grounds.  Suppose we  imagine a quite different status
quo entitlement  structure-one  in which  farmers  are prohibited
from allowing any pesticides to wash into the river. Under this alter-
native entitlement  structure a very different technical process would
be followed  by the agricultural industry-one  in which the discharge
of residues  into the river  is not part of the accepted  practice  for
growing certain crops.  This new legal regime-an entitlement  struc-
ture-would  certainly be an effective  incentive  for technical innova-
tion  in agriculture  so  that crops  might be  grown without the use  of
the pesticides  under consideration.  Of equal importance,  it would
mean that any discussions  to alter the status quo legal regime would
put the  burden of proof on the  agricultural sector rather than  on
consumers of fish (and the fishing industry).
While the debate would still rage over the safety of fish exposed to
chemical residues, notice that the consumers of fish would not be ex-
posed to a health risk during that debate. It is also worth noting that
the interests  of farmers in using pesticides would become very much
like the debates over the siting of hazardous waste facilities. In these
latter debates, it is the producer of such wastes who must address
the  disposal  of unwanted  residues.  The transaction  costs fall  on the
producer  whose  dominant  incentive  is to induce  reluctant  commu-
nities to accept the wastes.  While the  search goes on, those opposed
to such dumping are protected from unwanted disposal  of hazardous
wastes. These individuals  stand protected  by the presumptive rights
in the status quo.
A  more fundamental  difference  must also  be noted.  We  saw,  pre-
viously,  that if farmers were suddenly  to be prevented from allowing
pesticide  residues to wash into the river,  the situation would most
likely be characterized  as one of government  "interference"  with
the  farmers.  Those  who  accepted this  description might  also  be
tempted to suggest that  the farmers  had  a "right"  to allow  residues
to wash into the river and that the new policy represented an inter-
ference  with that "right."  As noted,  such assertions represent a fun-
damental  confusion  over the concept  of a right.  Until such confu-
sions  are addressed,  it will be impossible  to develop  a coherent
approach  to the problem  of environmental  policy.  I  have addressed
this issue  in more detail  elsewhere  [Bromley  and Hodge].  For now,
it is sufficient to consider how the presumed entitlement structure  of
the  status quo  leads to  a particular  idiom of regulation  in which  the
language  and  concepts  of economic  analysis  carry  unwarranted
weight.
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In a recent issue of Science magazine,  David Zilberman and his
co-authors  reviewed  a  number  of studies  addressing  the alleged
"losses"  from the banning  of agricultural  chemicals  grouped  under
the general heading  of "pesticides."  This article is of interest pre-
cisely because of the framing of the issues before us. As with all dis-
cussions of environmental  policy,  economists  are  encouraged  to
assess the costs and benefits of a change in the status quo.  In the
present instance,  California's proposition  128 provided  a convenient
vehicle for this assessment,  but the article also concerned the United
States as a whole. In discussing the probable impacts of various reg-
ulatory  actions,  the authors noted  that consumers  will face  a  "loss"
of $18  million.  Elsewhere  it was claimed  that consumers  rather than
producers would face the "largest total loss."  Finally, there were re-
peated references to the "costs,"  the "impacts" and the "losses"  that
would emanate from a variety of restrictions  on pesticides  in Ameri-
can agriculture.
I refer to this approach as highlighting the language of loss-a reg-
ulatory  idiom,  as  it were.  Discussing pesticide  use in agriculture  in
this manner frames the debate about chemicals  in a way that distorts
the  choices  we face,  and therefore,  about the decisions  likely to be
taken.  This particular framing of the issues rests solely on  a particu-
lar concept of the base against which change  is to be evaluated,  and
it is that base that allows the analyst to talk of the "losses"  from a
ban on agricultural chemicals.  To be sure,  all policy discussions must
be evaluated  against some reference  point,  and in the regulatory
business that reference  point always seems to be the status quo. Un-
fortunately, the status quo has a dubious claim  on our analytical  at-
tention.  To illustrate this point, let me digress a moment on technical
change.
Technical change brings myriad opportunities to the modern econ-
omy, most profound among those opportunities  is the prospect for
the adopting entrepreneur  to save money-thereby enhancing  one's
competitive  position.  It  is well understood  that  early adopters  reap
the bulk of the economic windfall  from technical change.  If markets
work  reasonably  well,  and  if others also adopt  the new  technique,
aggregate  production  will increase  leading  to price  declines.  Even-
tually,  the extra-normal profit  is squeezed  out  of the  sector  as  con-
sumers  benefit  through lower  prices.  Consumers-not  producers-
are the real winners when technical change occurs.
Pesticides  represent a  classic  example  of technical  innovation;
farmers can control pests more effectively  (that is,  at a lower cost)
than with other methods. The only proviso, and the key here,  is that
the full costs of pesticide  use are incorporated into the price farmers
pay  for pesticides.  Environmental  policy is precisely concerned with
the reality that not all of the relevant  costs of pesticide use are re-
flected in the price that a farmer pays for  a unit of the compound.
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forced to bear the  unwanted costs  of pesticide  use,  new rules on
pesticide use are the obvious  result.  Those new rules may encom-
pass taxes  to make the per-unit cost of chemicals  more expensive  to
the user, thereby creating  an incentive to reduce  their total use.  Or,
there may be a ban on certain compounds.  Note that a ban on chem-
ical  compounds  is  analytically  equivalent  to  a price  so  high that  no
producer would  find it feasible  to use that particular input.  Re-
gardless,  the effort  is directed toward getting the  price of chemicals
"right" through getting the rules "right."
In  a very important sense  then,  a new constellation  of rules re-
garding pesticide  use in agriculture must be understood as rectifying
the temporary circumstances  under which some  producers  and con-
sumers have managed to reap ill-gotten  gains.  Put somewhat differ-
ently,  farmers  will have  to  revert to  the prior technique for control-
ling pests. Of course the world does not stand still, and we would not
expect to see thousands  of farm laborers  out in the  fields  with hoes
dead  set against  weeds.  Some  alternative  to  the banned pesticides
will be found and agricultural production  will certainly continue.
The  essential  point  here is  that pronouncements  about consumer
and producer  losses must be considered  with some  care.  These  are
"losses"  as measured  against  a status quo in which agricultural  pro-
ducers had been free to impose external costs on society  at large.
The former  economic  gains  that  Zilberman,  et al.  choose  to call
"losses"  have come at the expense of those forced to bear the un-
wanted costs of their use.  We have here a simple case  of the shifting
of economic  advantage  among members of the populace.  Producers
and consumers  of the affected  products  had  a  temporary  windfall,
and now it is being taken away.  Are we so  certain that "loss"  is the
correct  word  to describe  this  new  situation,  particularly  when  that
language  forms an  essential part of the  arsenal  used  to  oppose  any
new regulations?  Put in its most stark terms, the  economic gains  re-
alized by producers  and consumers since the introduction of the par-
ticular  pesticides  now  considered  for  restriction  constitute  theft.
Given the  intense  interest  in  recovering  natural  resource  damages
from chemical  spills and accidents,  it is interesting that few notice
the extent to  which past use  of certain  chemicals  has imposed  its
own  form of damages.  Cast in this  light,  the alleged  "losses"  to  con-
sumers  of lettuce,  almonds,  grapes,  oranges and strawberries  (or
whatever) takes on new meaning.  Indeed, truth be told, the consum-
ers (and producers) of those  products have reaped a nice windfall  at
the expense  of others.  Now that the windfall  is recognized as having
come at  the expense  of those forced to bear unwanted costs, taking
it away somehow gets characterized  as a "loss."
The  idiom  of regulation  is  a function  of how the  policy  issue  is
framed.  If the status quo is regarded  as the legitimate norm against
which  change  is to be assessed,  then one  tries to estimate the  costs
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or  "impacts"  and the magnitude  of this  is then weighed versus  the
alleged  benefits  of the regulation.  In environmental  policy  many  of
the benefits are  of an uncertain kind,  or they will appear  in the fu-
ture. Those who  must bear the "cost"  of a change in the status quo
will mobilize  to resist change,  using the reality  of nebulous  benefits
as against the claimed known "costs"  of change.
The language  of losses must be seen for what it is,  and that is a
false and misleading  picture of the choices we face.  Zilberman, et al.
do mention the need to model long-run changes in supply and de-
mand.  That is indeed essential.  But the policy issue still turns on the
notion of the status quo against which change  is to be evaluated.  As
long as the idiom of regulation insists on labelling any change  in the
status quo  as a "loss"  we are prevented from reaching correct  deci-
sions.
Roles  and Positions
In my reaction to Commissioner  McGuire  I chided him for his ex-
tremism in defense of agricultural production regardless  of the envi-
ronmental  implications.  I noted that while his salary was paid by all
of the citizens of New York,  his approach seemed to suggest that the
interests  of farmers  were  all that  mattered.  If consumers  were poi-
soned by chemical  residues on fruits and vegetables,  it was  some
other agency's  problem.  To  a certain extent,  I fear  that those  of us
employed by colleges of agriculture risk being thought advocates for
increased agricultural production at all cost.
We have here a story about the intense interplay between tech-
nical change,  university research  and public perceptions  of the good
life.  I  will make  three interrelated  points.  First,  one major function
of universities  is to be concerned  with technological  change broadly
defined.  That is,  technology-and  technological  change-are  policy
choices in a  society with  universities being  at the core of that proc-
ess.  We  think  of ourselves as being involved  in teaching  and re-
search when,  in  fact,  we  are defining  (and  redefining)  the  tech-
nological  domain  of society.  Because new  knowledge  is  the central
component  of technology,  it is entirely consistent to regard  the
knowledge  industry as the essence  of technology  and  technological
change.  If we fail to understand this simple fact, and if we do not un-
derstand  technological  change,  then we  are bound to make serious
mistakes in educational policy.
The second point is that those  of us involved  in agriculture  and
natural resources at the university  level have important clientele
problems.  By this  I mean that many  educational programs  and pol-
icies, and the sequence of events that logically follow from those pro-
grams and policies,  are often at odds with the larger interests of the
citizenry-even that segment of it which we regard as our natural
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quences in the intermediate  run,  and serious problems in the  longer
run.
My final point is that science and scientific "progress"  have finally
been demystified  among the populace  and we will never again re-
turn to an era in which scientists carry extraordinary  legitimacy.  Sci-
entism  is a declining religion,  even among scientists.  These three
issues are central to the development  of educational  policies that will
affect agricultural and natural resource programs.
In my Choices article  [Bromley,  1991b] I discussed  the role of tech-
nology  and  technical  change  in  the context  of bovine  somatotropin
(BST). I argued there that the agricultural research enterprise as we
know it will surely die unless there  is more public  accountability.
Richard McGuire  argued in a companion piece that "environmen-
talists"  were to  blame for all manner  of undesirable trends  in  mod-
ern life-including the  eventual urban diet of seaweed,  soybeans
and brown rice.  He noted  that environmentalists  and farmers  were
allies in the good old days, but that somehow that divine partnership
had dissolved  in recent times as environmentalists  became more stri-
dent-and ridiculous-in their rhetoric.
I believe  that times have changed  for two reasons.  First,  the
stakes are now higher than previously.  That is, the costs of a mis-
take  are potentially  higher when it is a matter  of toxins getting  into
groundwater.  Secondly,  we are now in the midst of a general  proc-
ess  in  which  science  is being  challenged.  I  call this  the  demystifica-
tion  of science  and  the general  devaluation  of experts.  It  should be
clear that the citizenry, rightly or wrongly,  no longer trusts scientists
to make choices that are in the long-run interest of society.  From an
era  in  which  white-smocked  doctors  declared  the virtues  of Camel
cigarettes,  it is now obvious that someone appearing  with a white
smock  is a priori reason to marshall one's defenses  against the  "ex-
perts."  Cigarettes,  thalidomide  and  the  recreational  observation  of
nuclear tests in Nevada and Utah are but three obvious instances in
which the experts were wrong. There are many more examples that
one could  cite.  We have,  in the  past decade,  seen the complete  de-
mystification  of science,  and therefore  its delegitimization,  in the
eyes  of many.
The  citizenry  is  now much better educated,  better informed,  and
more  concerned with the world around them.  For that happy result
we have  the universities to thank.  Those who  now plead  for an en-
vironment  of unaccountable  science are  sadly mistaken if they hold
out hope  for that result. The demystification  of science  reflects back
on the  colleges of agriculture  at which  most of us find  employment.
There  are two reasons  why  colleges  of agriculture  cannot continue
to be justified on the grounds that they are helping farmers.  First, it
is not true by the  fallacy  of composition.  Second,  it  is not  politically
acceptable  because  the  interests  of farmers  will often  be at  odds
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groundwater  pollution  and  government programs  to  redistribute
wealth to agriculture are but a few examples.
Colleges of agriculture  can extract themselves from part of the  di-
lemma  only by  gradually  giving up responsibility  for the  well-being
of farmers.  Perhaps it is time to become,  instead,  more like business
schools,  engineering  schools and other professional schools-none  of
whom get blamed when businesses  fail. Those schools exist to create
new  knowledge  pertinent  to  a particular  class  of economic  activity,
and  to work  with industry on  problems.  But never  have they  as-
sumed they were responsible for the health of a particular sector.
When the machine  tool  industry in Wisconsin  was  having difficulty
surviving,  of course  the  College  of Engineering  rushed  to help  out.
And that is the very essence  of our land grant university.  But that
help was in the form of new technology that displaced a few workers
and probably  disadvantaged  a few firms that could  not afford  to in-
vest in the new equipment.  Did those firms who failed then blame
the College  of Engineering?  I doubt  it.  They failed  because  they
could  not compete  in a world economy-just as lots of farmers fail
for the same reason.
As the number  and  influence  of rural legislators  has fallen  in the
state there is less  of a rural voice in state politics.  Those few "voices
of agriculture"  who remain are without many allies and they seem to
believe we should fill that role. Hence, we get brought in as rural ad-
vocates  on many issues that we  probably should not. It is possible
that  our lobbying  and cultivation  of farm  groups has  brought  on
some  of our trouble. There  is no way we can satisfy  all of them since
they  represent  such  disparate  visions  of what agriculture  is  and
should be.
As we become concerned  with the broader implications  of agri-
cultural research, we automatically cultivate  a new clientele. We can
show that, while we continue our commitment to productive efficien-
cy on international competitiveness grounds,  we also have a commit-
ment to research on the problems that arise from that process.  Each
research project carries  implications  for which groups in society will
be differentially advantaged  and disadvantaged,  and it helps us if we
admit this at the beginning-and  pledge to study that issue too.  The
larger  society  has a legitimate  right to know  how  its tax dollars are
being expended  in the research arena. I think we show ourselves to
be responsible  if we recognize that larger interest and show that we,
too, are concerned.
Conclusion
I have tried here to emphasize the importance  of language and
concepts  in thinking about the "balance"  between  environmental
concerns  and economic  development.  Central here are  notions of
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economists  use when  assessing  policy  options.  To  label certain  im-
pacts as "losses"  not only  distorts the choice  problem,  but also  im-
plies some legitimacy  of the status quo.  Our public policy education
will be coherent  only if we  are conscious  of how language  and con-
cepts dominate the policy dialogue.
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